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government accountable for quality HIV
prevention, testing and treatment services.
The prevention community is coming
to terms with the complexity of HIV
prevention and being urged to make better
use of existing data, to ensure resources
are directed to where the epidemic is and
to what drives it, to address vulnerability
and structural determinants, and to apply
what we know works with sufﬁcient
quality, intensity and scale.
81 314 These
are the principles that have characterised
Avahan’s approach from the start. The fact
that, this many years into the epidemic,
we are also rediscovering theimportance of
sex-worker interventions makes Avahan’s
achievement over the last 5years even
more remarkable. Avahan stands as a rare
example of the enormous power of data
andcommunitydespeciallywhenworking
togetherdto challenge an epidemic and
a mindset, and to overcome both.
The ﬁndings and conclusions in this report are those of
the authors and do not necessarily represent the ofﬁcial
position of the US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention.
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Avahan: the transition to
a publicly funded programme as
a next stage
Prasada J V R Rao
Avahan the ﬂag ship programme of the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF)
for the prevention of HIV in India was
projected as a unique business model that
brought private sector efﬁciency to a public
health programme. However, within a
period of 3 years after its launch, the
programme already started planning for a
phasedwithdrawal anda ‘graceful transfer’
into a publicly funded programme.
1
Avahan with a US$250 million project
cost was effectively complementing the
Government of India’s efforts to control
AIDS through its own publicly funded
National AIDS Control Program (NACP).
Avahan was tasked to deliver to scale, high
qualityprevention interventions tohigh-risk
community groups in six high prevalence
states and make an impact on the progres-
sion of the epidemic in these states.
Six years later, despite its impressive
success in rapid scale up and efﬁcient
management of programme delivery,
Avahan is coming under criticism for
trying to wind up early from India, and
worse, for experimenting with a model
that is high cost in terms of unit costs of
intervention. The programme, which
aimed at ultimate community ownership
of the interventions, has initiated the
process of transfer before this objective is
fully realised.
The feasibility of Avahan’s proposed
transition into a publicly funded pro-
gramme can only be assessed against the
background of the importance given to
prevention programmes among high-risk
groups in NACP.
India’s national programme
2 was ahead
of its time in 1999 when it earmarked 14%
of its programme budget for ‘targeted
interventions’ in the prevention pro-
grammes for high-risk populations. Four
years later, when BMGF launched the
Avahan programme, it had a ready-made
model of focused interventions among
these risk groups to adopt, reﬁne and
upgrade. The upgraded model of focused
interventions was allotted 57% of the US
$250 million of committed resources for
Avahan.
3 The ﬁrst phase of Avahan ended
in 2008 with impressive impact results on
the coverage of high-risk populations,
strengthening prevention infrastructure
and the delivery of services.
While the general impression was that
Avahan will continue to deliver these
services under the new business model, the
BMGF had other priorities. The strategy of
theFoundationseemstohaveshiftedtothe
transfer of ownership to Government,
much earlier than originally envisaged. In
October 2006, less than 3 years after the
launch, the mid-term review had already
recommended ‘exploring alternative posi-
tions to align the organisation with
changing priorities as the program
managers scale down their implementor
role and focus more on packaging the
learnings from Avahan’.
3
The success deﬁnition of Avahan
therefore shifted only to demonstrate
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Editorialsprogrammes at scale with coverage and
quality and ‘graceful transfer’ of
programme funding without disruption.
1
The publicly funded NACP phase 3 has
a much stronger focus on prevention
among high-risk groups, but the expansion
of the Government’s programme without
adequate managerial and monitoring
support at the State AIDS Control Society
(SACS) level has caused serious operational
problems in the delivery of quality pre-
vention services. The SACS are ill equipped
to take on a vastly scaled up intervention
programme for high-risk communities.
Some of the state societies face rotation of
managers almost every year undermining
the effectiveness of programmes.
However, NACP 3 has a lower per capita
cost for its interventions compared with the
Avahan programme. Whereas the sub-grant
level costs of Avahan compare favourably
with NACP costs, (US$45e40 per beneﬁ-
ciary) the Avahan programme spends much
higher (US$14e5) costs on programme
management.
4To theNational AIDSControl
Organisation (NACO) and SACS this pres-
ents a better model for the more efﬁcient
management of focused programmes.
Strengthening the management structure of
the SACS is an essential prerequisite for the
transfer of Avahan programmes, even in
better administered states.
The area of concern for NACO is the
large overhead costs Avahan incurs in the
senior managerial cadre. Avahan spends
US$18 per beneﬁciary on these overheads,
whereas NACO spends US$5 per beneﬁ-
ciary.
4 It also includes incentives to attract
beneﬁciaries to service facilities, which
a government programme cannot afford. A
smooth transfer of management to NACO
entails a substantial reduction of these
overheads, which account for almost 25%
of the project costs.
It is therefore a matter of debate whether
a well-run and well-funded community
programme such as Avahan should trans-
form itself into a publicly funded
programme. The transition model being
worked out still provides for technical
support from Avahan phase 2 to the trans-
ferred programme. Field-level supervision
will be strengthened by following Avahan
standards. The transition will be only partial
during NACP phase 3, with only 10% of the
programme component transferred in the
ﬁrst year. Full transfer is envisaged only
with the fourth phase of NACP in 2013/14.
The transition model does not take
intoconsiderationthenewstrategiesthatare
now recommended for managing commu-
nity-based prevention programmes. It is an
establishedfactcommunityprogrammesare
bettermanagedbycommunitiesthemselves.
Avahan itself has started with this philos-
ophy but the transition model does not
sufﬁciently articulate on how to ensure it in
a publicly funded programme.
The Commission on AIDS in Asia
recommended an alternative model of
public private partnerships for ﬁnancing
and managing community programmes.
5
Transfer of funds from government
agencies to civil society partners suffers
from bureaucratic delays and corruption. A
public private partnership model with an
autonomous body with government and
community partnership provides a better
alternative for the transfer of Avahan
programmes. BMGF and NACO should
carefully examine this as a better model for
‘nationalising’ the programme. This can
also be progressively adopted by NACO for
its own prevention programmes in NACP
4 for the more efﬁcient management and
utilisation of resources and accountability
for performance.
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Recreating the impact
of interventions in the absence
of baseline data: challenges
for intervention programmes
Jonathan M Zenilman
Condom-promotion interventions have
been a cornerstone of the HIV-prevention
effort since the mid-1980s.
1 Initial efforts
were largely education-based and used
simple process outcomes, such as condom-
distribution statistics. Programmes rapidly
became more sophisticated, and interven-
tions based on behavioural models were
rapidly implemented. One of the most
challenging issues in designing and evalu-
atingtheseinterventionshasbeenoutcome
measures. Ideally, behavioural interven-
tions should be evaluated on disease-inci-
dent impact measures. Since HIVincidence
is uncommon even in high-incident areas,
intervention impact has largely used
behavioural measures, such as the propor-
tion of sexual acts in which condoms were
used. These are by deﬁnition self-reported
and subject to bias. In HIV/STD clinical
settings, and in the context of prevention
intervention studies, there is often implicit
social desirability to over-report condom
use. These measurement issues have
a profound impact on intervention effec-
tiveness evaluation.
Approaches to improving validity have
included reﬁning survey report methods.
This has included intensive training of
interviewers, and using self-administered
computerised techniques. Using other
biological measures, such as other sexually
transmitted infections, is not practical in
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